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SHARIF S. ELMUSA*

Dividing Common Water Resources
According to International Water Law:

The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli
Waters
It [the Bellagio Draft Treaty] is based on the proposition that water rights
should be determined by mutual agreement rather than be the subject of
uncontrolled, unilateral taking, and that rational conservation and
protection actions require joint resource management machinery.' It is
precisely because the water is often inadequate to satisfy the just needs
of all that rules [for equitable distribution] are required.2
ABSTRACT
The present articlefocuses on the reallocationof water rights in the
common Palestinian-Israeliwater sources, a core issue of the water
and general conflict between the two sides. In particular,I wish to
explore how reallocation can be worked out on the basis of factors
stipulated in the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" of international water law and how these factors may be made operational.I
argue that those factors favor Palestiniansand certainlyentitle them
to a much larger share than Israel permits them to tap at present.
Exact shares cannot be determined except on the basis of mutually-agreed data as well as more rigorouscalculationsthan attempted
here. I also argue that reallocation is possible without causing
"appreciable harm" to Israel, and that, within the context of a
peaceful politicalsettlement, is a positive-sum game. The assumption
here is that the endogenous water resources of the West Bank and
Gaza would be repossessed by Palestiniansas part of an eventual
peaceful settlement.
1. INTRODUCTION
A Swedish water expert, Malin Falkenmark, once described the
behavior of water in the water cycle as that of a "Chameleon, continu-

* This article was written while the author was a Fulbright Fellow, The Applied Research
Institute, Jerusalem.
1. Robert Hayton & Albert Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters:The Bellagio Draft Treaty,
29 Nat. Resources J. 663, 664 (1989).
2. Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in The Law of International Drainage Basins 44
(A.H.Garretson et al. eds., 1966).
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ously reappearing in new roles in the human environment."3 One such
role is as an agent of conflict in international drainage basins. Virtually
all the waters of such basins in the Middle East are contested: the Nile,
the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Jordan. The central bone of contention
in all of them is how much water each of the riparians is entitled to
receive from those common sources. Of course, to say, as some analysts
have, that the water conflicts would lead to "water wars"4 highly
exaggerates the potential consequences of the disputes. Nevertheless, they
are real and can contribute to the chronic instability in the Middle East.
Furthermore, with population and economic growth and relentless
urbanization, the pressure on these fixed water resources will mount, and
the conflict can only sharpen.
Perhaps in recognition of this, water issues have been accorded
a prominent place in the ongoing peace negotiations. They are on the
agenda of the Bilateral track, in which Israel negotiates with each of the
Arab parties individually, as well as the Multilateral track in which more
than 35 countries participate in five working groups, one of them solely
devoted to water. In the Multilaterals, the aim is to promote regional
cooperation in joint management, conservation, and enhancement of
supply and data availability. Another aim is to help the parties in the
Bilaterals overcome some of the impediments to reaching accords on the
reallocation of common waters, for regional cooperation on water is
contingent upon bilateral agreements.
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, water is a central ingredient,
perhaps only second to land, of the wider conflict between the two sides.
It is also more difficult than other water disputes in the region as it is
intimately linked to the Palestinian-Zionist conflict over the land and with
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. At the core
of the dispute is the disproportionate allocation of water rights, or
allocation of water quantities among the riparians, in the common
Palestinian-Israeli water resources in favor of Israel as well as the
encroachment of the settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)
on the endogenous waters of this territory. There are other issues as well,
and although they arise chiefly out of Israel's quest to maintain its and
the settlers' water privilege, they also assume a life of their own. These
issues include Israel's legal and institutional control over the water sector
and monopoly over water-related information. The focus will be on the
core issue of reallocation of water rights.
Since 1967, Israel maintained and actually increased its disproportionate exploitation of the water resources common to it and the
3. Malin Falkenmark, New Ecological Approach to the Water Cycle: Ticket to the Future,13
Ambio 152, 154 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Joyce R. Starr, Water Wars, 82 Foreign Policy 17 (1991).
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Palestinians, taking 80-85 percent of their annual recharge, as is indicated
below. It did so by imposing severe limitations on Palestinian access to
these. Israel has virtual control, both legal and executive, over the
production, distribution, and use of water in the OPT (Occupied
Palestinian Territory). At the same time, it denies the Palestinians a voice
in decision-making. Since its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, it
has issued a series of Military Orders5 that give the Israeli "water officer,"
who answers to the Israeli Water Commissioner, non-negotiable powers
(1) over granting licenses to drill wells or to initiate any water project,
and (2) over limiting the amount of water Palestinians can draw from
their wells. The process of institutional control was sealed in 1982 when
Israel formally "transferred" the management of water resources in the
West Bank to the parastatal Israeli water company, Mekorot. Israel has
extensively used this control mechanism to suppress Palestinian water
demand, downgrade the role of the Water Department, which had been
in existence before 1967, to administrative functions only, supply the
Israeli settlements with disproportionate amounts of water, and withhold
information.
Complex as the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict may be, the key
to its resolution lies in working out an equitable apportionment regime,
in addition to some form of joint management, of the common water
resources. This premise has been recognized in the historic Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles, which was reached in Oslo and signed in
Washington on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. The
declaration calls for the initiation of a water development program
prepared by experts from both sides, which would include, among other
things, recommendations for studies and plans "on water rights of each
party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for
implementation in and beyond the interim period."4 The purpose of the
present article is to contribute to the discussion on how the equitable
utilization of the common water resources can be realized on the basis of
the list of "factors" of international water law. In a sense, the paper also
represents an attempt to "operationalize" these factors. I do not wish to
offer a plan or blueprint for a solution, but rather preliminary ideas for
a realistic reallocation that addresses the chief questions that have arisen
or likely to arise in future discussions. I show that, with all factors
considered, Palestinians are entitled to a larger share than Israel, and

5. Israeli Military Orders are the primary legislative form for the Palestinians under
Israeli occupation.
6. For the full text of the agreement, see Associated Press, Mideast Accord: The
Document, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,1993, at A8. The interim period refers to the five-year period
in which the Palestinians will establish self-government, with negotiations on the final status
of the OPT to commence two to three years into the interim period.
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certainly to a larger share than they are permitted at present. Exact shares
cannot be determined except on the basis of agreed-upon data as well as
more rigorous calculations than attempted here. I also examine how
reallocation is possible without causing "appreciable harm" to Israel, and
that, within the context of a peaceful political settlement, it is not a
zero-sum game.
Before proceeding with my main topic, I wish to make two
contextual remarks. First, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict
does not preclude a basin-wide (the Jordan River plus Mediterranean
basins) approach for sharing and management of water resources.
International water law would in likelihood be the starting point for any
joint water agreements, so much of the discussion about redistribution
here should be applicable to the basin at large. Moreover, there is already
the precedent of the 1955 Johnston Plan which divided the waters of the
Jordan River among the riparians, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The
plan allotted approximately 209 million cubic meters per year (mcmy) for
the West Bank, which was then part of Jordan. The joint Palestinian-Israeli groundwater resources were not covered in it, but would have to be
included if a new basin-wide agreement is renegotiated. Second, the
remaining discussion of the text is replete with figures and facts, and,
although the data conflicts are a topic in and of themselves, a caveat
regarding them is unavoidable. For technical as well as political reasons,
these data are in dispute among Israeli, Palestinian and outside specialists. Palestinian researchers often cite, albeit mistrustfully, Israeli statistics,
for the simple reason that Israel exercises a virtual monopoly on
water-related research, severely restricting their access. Until mutual
agreement is reached, the data in the paper ought to be considered
tentative.
The paper is organized as follows. I will briefly delineate the
common water resources and give reasons as to why they need to be
reallocated. Then, I demonstrate how such reallocation can be done on
the basis of international water law. I conclude by illustrating how
reallocation need not be a zero-sum game for Israel.
II. WHY REALLOCATION?
The need for reallocating the common water resources is predicated on: (1) the unilateral, disproportionate appropriation by Israel of the
common waters; (2) the substandard level of water consumption of the
Palestinians; and (3) the wide water gap between Palestinians and
Israelis. These are commonly acknowledged realities and need only a
brief summation. Relevant data are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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TABLE 1. Common Hydrology and Appropriation by Israel
Recharge
(mcmy)
West Bank
Common:
1. Western aquifer
2. Northern aquifer
3. Western wadis
4. The Jordan River
Endogenous:
1. Eastern aquifer
2. Eastern wadis
Gaza
Common:
1. Wadi Gaza
"Disputably" common:a
1. Flow from Israel to
Gaza's aquifer
Endogenous:
1. Gaza aquifer

Israel's appropriation
(including settlers')
(%)

94
85
- 100

340-390
120-145
20
(See text)
100-175
30-40

0.

30-50
00-00

variable

50-60

00-90

50-70

06-20

Sources: Abu Mayla, Y. The Futureof the Water Situation in the West Bank and Gaza and Israel
[in Arabic] (Islamic University, Gaza, photocopy, 1992); Boneh, Y. and U. Baida, Water
Sources in Judaea and Samaria and their Exploitation, in YEHUDA VESHMORON (Absalom
Shmueli eds., West Jerusalem, Keenan, 1977; [in Hebrew] translation at AMER, supra note
15); Bruins and Tuinhof, supra note 21; Friends of the Middle East, supra note 15; Kahan,
supra note 24; Kolars, supra note 17; Naff, 1991, supra note 7; Orni, E. and E. Efrat,
GEOGRAPHY OF ISRAEL [hereinafter Geography] (3d ed., Philadelphia, Jewish Publications
Society of America, 1973); Rofe and Raffety Consulting Engineers, WEST BANK HYDROLOGY, 1963-1965 (for the Central Water Authority, Amman, Jordan, 1965); Schwarz, J., Water
Resources in Judaea and Samaria, in JUDAEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA (J. Elazar, ed.,
Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1982); Shuval, supra note 13; Tahal, supra
note 17.
Notes:
'So designated because Palestinian and Israeli specialists disagree on whether it is common.
'Geography, at 45, gives the annual average flow as 30-40 mcny, while Schwarz, supra note
39, as 14 mcmy and states that Israel impounds I mcmy and is planning 8 mcmy more.
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TABLE 2. Water Consumption and Irrigated Land for Palestinians, Israel
and Settlers
Consumption

Domestic

Area
Irrigated/
irrigable
(1,000
dunums)
(%)

125-130
100-183c
450-500

25-35
23- 38d
2 100

100
120
2,150

580-650
2 1,40 0 d

90-120
?

40
7

Aggregate
Palestinians:
West Bank
Gaza
Israel
Settlers:
West Bank
Gaza

Irrigation
(cm/capita/year)

20-0
55
95

1 dunum = 1,000 square meters = 0.10 hectare
Sources: based on Abu Mayla, Y., cited in table 1; Awartani, H., cited in table 1; Awartani,
H., A Projection of Water Demand in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Nablus, al-Najah U., Econ.
Dept., 1991, photocopy); Awartani, H., and S. Juda, Irrigated Agriculture in the Occupied
PalestinianTerritory [in Arabic] (publisher and year same as in Id.); Benvenisti, M. and S.
Khayat, THE ATLAS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (West Jerusalem, the Jerusalem
Post for the West Bank Data Project, 1988); Haddad, M., and S. Abu Ghusha, supra note 19;
Hyatt, E. et al, Peace Now Settlement Watch: [Excerpts fromi Comprehensive Report on
Settlements, January 22, 1992, March-April New Outlook 15-17 (1992, Israel); Kahan, supra
note 24; State Comptroller, supra note 16; Tahal, supra note 17.
Notes:
'For the West Bank and Gaza domestic consumption includes small amounts of industrial
consumption also.
bTahal estimates the irrigable area at 310,000 dunums, excluding 320,000 dunums which it
says have low soil classification. Awartani and Juda put the irrigable area at 535,000
dunums, of which 172,000 could be readily irrigated. Of these, about 150,000 dunums are
in the Jordan Valley, which have been confiscated, enclosed or deprived of water by the
Israeli authorities, or the owners of which do not have access to investment capital.
'he high figure is from Tahal and the low from Abu Mayla, the difference derives from
Tahal's greater estimate of consumption and lower population count. Abu Mayla's are also
for 1991 and Tahal's are for 1989. Awartani's estimate (Awartani, 1991b) falls between the
two.
"Much higher figures are cited in Palestinian sources. The per capita consumption of the
settlers is sensitive to the increment in the overall estimate, owing to their small number,
3,000 or more.
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TABLE 3. Summary of Indices of the Israeli-Palestinian Water Gap
Palestinian
Consumption per capita:
Aggregate
Domestic
Price per cubic meter:
Absolute:
Domestic
Agriculture
Relative to GNP/capita:
Domestic
Irrigated agriculture:
Land area per capita
Irrigated/cultivated
Irrigated/irrigable

Israeli

100
100

300-400
300-400

100
120

100
100

a 800

100

100
100
100

400
1,000
400-500

Sources: Previous tables; Tahal, supra note 17.
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Water in the West Bank and Gaza is available in aquifers and
surface sources, with groundwater being the chief source. Insofar as the
water conflict is concerned, those water sources can be divided into
"endogenous" sources that commence and terminate within the boundaries of the OPT and "international," sources that flow into or out of
them.
In the West Bank, the surface sources consist of two groups of
wadis, or small streams, the Jordan River and numerous springs. The two
groups of wadis issue from the central hills region, which is the
topographic backbone of the West Bank and the predominant hydrological region. One group flows untapped east of the watershed toward the
Jordan and is endogenous. The second group flows west through the
West Bank and Israel toward the Mediterranean and is international; its
waters are "harvested" inside Israel.
Groundwater in the West Bank is comprised of three main
aquifer systems: eastern, western and northern. The eastern aquifer falls
essentially within the West Bank (endogenous), while the western and
northern aquifers are common to the West Bank and Israel. Perhaps as
much as 95 percent of the area of the western and northern aquifers is
located in the West Bank from which they also receive 70-85 percent of
their annual replenishment. In other words, those aquifers are, physically
speaking, primarily West Bank aquifers. They are at the center of the
water dispute, because Israel appropriates, from hundreds of wells on its
side of the border, more than 90 percent of their annual recharge.
In Gaza, too, the chief source of water is groundwater. There are
no rivers, and the only surface water sources are wadis. The most
important is Wadi Gaza with catchment areas in the West Bank, Gaza
and Israel; its water is impounded by Israel before it enters Gaza. As for
groundwater, there is only one exploitable aquifer in Gaza, overlain by
highly permeable sand dunes near the coast and finer soil deposits
inland. It is endogenous to Gaza. Part of its water, however, flows from
the east from Israel. Palestinian hydrologists contend that Israel intercepts
this flow through wells on eastern Gaza border leaving meager quantities
for Gaza. Israel denies the claim. Until there are mutually agreed upon
data, this flow should tentatively be designated "disputably" common.
In sum, and apart from the Jordan River, the aggregate volume
of common Israeli-Palestinian water resources may amount to 565-655
mcmy or more, replenished primarily from the West Bank.
Israel unilaterally and through the imposition of severe administrative and legal restrictions on Palestinian access appropriates as much
as 80-85 percent of the common waters (Table 1). It also has been
overpumping, that is, pumping more than the rate of replenishment or
safe yield, from the common aquifers and those within its borders. Such
overextraction has been criticized by Israelis themselves because it
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endangers the long-term viability of the aquifers. In addition, Israel
significantly encroaches, through the settlers, on the endogenous waters
of the OPT, particularly the West Bank's eastern aquifer. Finally, Israel
has been extracting 150-200 mcmy more water from the Jordan basin than
the 375-400 mcmy allotted to it in the Johnston Plan 7 not to mention 5-10
mcmy from the Golan Heights.
A net result of Israel's unilateral action is a substandard level of
consumption for Palestinians in the OPT as well as a wide water gap
between them and Israelis. A few statistics starkly illustrate the situation.
Palestinian consumption in the West Bank rose by a mere 20 mcmy
during the period of the occupation, compared to Israel's 400 mcmy.
Palestinian domestic consumption is meager, 20-30 cubic meters (cm) per
person per year, or about 15-20 gallons per day. In villages and camps,
consumption can be a third of this. In relative terms, the per capita
aggregate water consumption in Israel is three to four times as much as
in the OPT, and the same is true of domestic consumption. The low water
use among Palestinians is a case of suppressed demand, not simply of
different demand schedules stemming from different income levels. The
domestic water supply in the West Bank and Gaza is intermittent in
nearly all the towns and villages, and many villages and hamlets do not
receive piped waters. Furthermore, relative to their GNP/capita, the
Palestinians in the West Bank are charged about five times per unit of
domestic water as in Israel.!
Beside the low quantities and higher prices, Palestinians obtain
water of inferior quality. In central Gaza, the water's salinity can be as
much as three times the 200 mg/liter chloride recommended by the
World Health Organization (WHO). Water is also polluted with nitrates
from the return water of human consumption and agriculture. The result
has been a deleterious impact on health conditions and quality of life.
Even in the West Bank, salinity of irrigation water in the Jordan Valley
and Jinin areas has been a growing problem, primarily as a result of
overpumping by settlers and the refusal of Israeli authorities to let

The estimates are based on John Kolars, Water Resources of the Middle East, Canadian
J. Dev. Stud. 103-29 tbl. 8 (1992) (Sustainable Water Resources Management in Arid
Countries special issue); Naff, supra note 8, at 15; Tahal Consulting Engineers, Ltd., Israel
Water Sector Review: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Options 2.4 (1990)
(study submitted to the World Bank). Israel justifies its taking away of the Yarmuk by
claiming that the water was allocated to the power that had sovereignty over the West Bank,
thereby equating occupation with sovereignty See B.K. Nijim, Water Resources in the History
of the Palestine-IsraelConflict, 21 GeoJournal 317-24 (1990).
8. The 1992 GNP per capita was $12,351 in Israel, $2,437 in the West Bank, and $1,409 in
Gaza. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract (1993) (Isr.). The Israeli settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza receive heavy water subsidies for domestic water use that are not
given to other Israelis.
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Palestinian farmers extract water from the deeper aquifer.'
Still, the water gap between Palestinians and Israel is most
apparent in agriculture. The overall irrigated area in Israel is 10 times
greater than in the OPT, or nearly four times greater per person. Israel
has been able to irrigate nearly one-half of its cultivated land and 95
percent of the irrigable land, while the irrigated Palestinian land on the
West Bank, where considerable expansion is possible, is only five percent
of the cultivated area and less than one-fourth of the irrigable. Yet, while
Palestinian agriculture cannot expand because of the lack of water, Israeli
farmers, for political reasons, receive heavy water subsidies that
encourage profligate water consumption. For example, Israeli farmers
irrigate crops, such as wheat and cotton, that would not be profitable
without water and other subsidies. The subsidies may be an internal
Israeli affair, and have come under the scrutiny of Israeli specialists, their
impact, however, is not. Moreover, Israel has allowed the settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza to irrigate 47,000 dunums of confiscated land, with
water allocations per unit area nearly double that on Palestinian land.
Palestinian irrigated area, meanwhile, has stagnated and water salinity in
many places has lowered crop yields and quality.
Israeli and other analysts often point out that their country
suffers a water stress that affects its social and economic development.
Certainly, no one would suggest that geographic Palestine is a water
cornucopia. But it is not so obvious that the social and economic
development of Israel has been hampered by the lack of water, not when
it has been able to irrigate nearly all of its irrigable land. More important,
water stress is relative, and Palestinians are far more water-stressed than
Israelis. To repeat the observation of Jerome Lipper: "it isprecisely
because the water is often inadequate to satisfy the needs of all that rules
[of equitable distribution] are required."10
III. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION
A mutual agreement on dividing the common waters between
Israelis and Palestinians can be achieved through direct negotiations,
mediation or arbitration. Because joint water management, by definition,
requires cooperation, direct negotiations are preferable. Unfortunately,
however, Israel's current position does not give much hope for the
success of direct negotiations, as will be pointed out shortly. On the other
hand, mediation could subject Palestinians to undue pressure based on
9. Hisham Awartani, The Artesian Wells in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Reality
and Ambition 31-39 (1992) (in Arabic).
10. Lipper, supra note 2, at 44.
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considerations of power, rather than fairness. In the end, and unless Israel
exhibits more flexibility, arbitration, to which Egypt and Israel resorted
to resolve the dispute over Taba, may be the most viable Palestinian
option.
Whichever procedure the two sides opt for would need a guide
for devising a new sharing regime. One such guide is international law;
another relies on analytical methods based on optimization and cost-benefit analysis, such as Paretian environmental analysis and cooperative
game theory. I am concerned in this paper with the division of waters
according to international water law. International water law serves as a
better framework for clarifying many issues in the conflict, such as Israeli
insistence on maintaining prior or existing use and telling Palestinians to
import water instead of reallocation, or Palestinian advocacy of naturebased reallocation. Also, international water law incorporates all the
"variables" of the other approach.
The pertinent aspect of international water law is the "factors" of
the doctrine of "equitable apportionment." I will consider five factors
common to the 1966 Helsinki Rules of the International Law Association
(ILA), the 1988 Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) of the
United Nations and the 1989 Bellagio Draft treaty," which Palestinians
and Israelis may wish to consider as a model. Those factors are: (1) the
natural attributes of the water source; (2) prior or existing use; (3) social
and economic needs; (4) alternative risources and their comparative costs;
and (5) avoidance of appreciable harm.
It has been often pointed out that international water law is
nonbinding and lacks enforcement mechanisms. This is true, but it may
also be the "best we've got" as a guide for negotiations. The factors it
stipulates are based on treaties and conventions ratified by governments,

11. The treaty is wide-ranging and sensitive to the commonality as well as divergence of
interests among the parties concerned, and recognizes both their rights and responsibilities.
It contains articles on joint management; establishment of a joint commission; enforcement
and oversight responsibilities; unified database; the inclusive notion of "underground
environment" protection; conservation areas; emergency situations, such as droughts;
dispute resolution; and so on. Some of the treaty's provisions would not be terribly relevant
(such as the planned depletion) because of the absence of joint fossil aquifers and the
scarcity of water supply; many of them, however, are significant to the joint Israeli-Palestinian situation. The joint commission and the unified database would be necessary because
of the intensive hydrological interdependence. The commission's ability to declare
emergencies, especially droughts, is also important as droughts are common. The treaty is
also sensitive to countries' jealousies about sovereignty and does not endow the joint
commission with powers that may be considered a serious transgression on it. Also,
regarding sovereignty, the notion of "conservation area" avoids making all the common
groundwater area such a zone and is especially applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian situation
because the groundwater boundaries extend over nearly all the political boundaries that are
expected to be designated between them.
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custom, generally accepted principles, decisions in the judiciary, and the
opinions of qualified persons (publicists). They would, if approached in
good faith, balance the interests of both sides within the constraints of the
available resources. For instance, the natural attributes of the joint sources
favor the Palestinians while prior use serves the Israelis. In addition, the
factors take into account the capabilities and water requirements of each
party by specifying the social and economic needs and the costs of
alternative resources as criteria for apportionment. Finally, by stipulating
that "appreciable harm" ought to be avoided, the doctrine of equitable
apportionment encourages the parties not to cause each other "appreciable harm" and to seek allocation schedules and other mechanisms
commensurate with this goal.
One assumes that both Palestinians and Israelis would wish to
abide by international water law if their recent accommodation is to
move forward. So far, they have agreed in the Oslo declaration of
principles, noted above, that the final settlement of the political conflict
will be based on the implementation of the United Nations' Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338. Also, in the statement cooperation
between the two sides in the water field in the same declaration, they
employed, albeit without specific reference to international water law,
two principles often invoked by this law, namely, the equitable utilization
as well as the joint management, of the common water resources. The
problems that the negotiations are likely to run into are likely to stem
more from how each party will interpret international water law to gain
advantage rather than from a refusal to acknowledge it.
1. PriorUse versus NaturalAttributes
Israelis usually insist on considering one factor: prior or existing
use. Prior use means maintaining the status quo, or extracting 80-90
percent of the common waters. Many Israelis have in fact convinced
themselves that the common waters are theirs. The following statement
by Elisha Kally exemplifies the Israeli stance:
Palestinian claims to water presently under Israeli controlparticularly the Yarkon Taninim aquifer [the Israeli term for
the western aquifer]-will not be practical because of Israel's
own water shortages and because they will not have any
standing in international law (due to the legal preference for
existing and historical consumption over new claims).
There is no doubt that Israel's dominant military power and
present control of the headwaters represent the backdrop of this stance.
International water law authorities stress that all factors must be weighed
and prior use is not paramount. For instance, Hayton and Utton, two
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prominent members of the group that drafted the Bellagio Draft Treaty,
state: "This language [weighing all the different factors] has become
accepted virtually universally."12 Not so universally, it would seem.
Other arguments could be marshaled against Israel's prior use
claim. It may be said that it was lucky for Israel that prevailing social and
economic conditions before 1967 did not permit Palestinians to extract
larger amounts from the common aquifers. Now that Israel has exploited
that very water successfully to spur its own economic development, it is
time that Palestinians be given the chance to develop their own economy,
a process hamstrung by, among other things, lack of water. In fact, in
some of the rules of equitable distribution the "stage of economic
development" is deemed as one of the factors to be weighed. In any case,
prior use remains a de facto condition and does not acquire legitimacy
or become de jure, unless the co-riparian agrees to it. Israel had not given
"prior notification," as international water law requires, to Jordan, then
the co-riparian, when it began in the early 1960s to extract substantial
quantities of water from the common aquifers and to modify the
hydrology of the basin by extracting water from hundreds of wells and
letting the spring discharge diminish. In fact, Joshua Schwarz, a high
level manager at Tahal, the parastatal Israeli water planning company,
told the author that Israel was not obligated to notify Jordan because the
water from the aquifers "had always been flowing to the springs
emerging in Israel, and nobody except Israel's Water Commission has to
be notified on their use."13 This stance may be faulted on two grounds.
First, Israel was not using the springs themselves, thus altering the
natural character of the aquifer. Second, and more important, is that Israel
was unilaterally establishing a prior use level which it would subsequently claim as its legitimate share of the common aquifers, when in fact it
should have been established by mutual agreement with Jordan. Be that
as it may, Palestinians today cannot be expected to accept a grossly unfair
status quo.
And if it is a matter of selective interpretation of international
water law, Palestinians could insist that the only factor to weigh is the
natural attributes of the water sources. Some Palestinian authors and
specialists indeed call the western and northern aquifers "Palestinian
waters."' More concretely, Jad Isaac and Hisham Zarour have proposed
that "nature's-apportionment" be the sole criterion for dividing common
waters and devised a mathematical formula for this purpose. The formula
12. Hayton & Utton, supra note 1, at 669.
13. Letter from Joshua Schwartz, Tahal Consulting Engineers, Ltd., to author (Feb. 23,
1993) (on file with author).
14. See, e.g., Ali al-Jirbawi, & Rami Abd al-Hadi, The Waters of the Palestinian State: From
Taking Away to Restoration, 4 Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya 84 (1990) (in Arabic).
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incorporates only those variables that pertain to the natural properties of
the shared water bodies, to the exclusion of other factors. Nature-based
apportionment is the way shared mineral resources are divided,' and
it can be argued, as Zarour and Isaac argue, that it ought to be applicable
to water as well. On the other hand, the history of water allocation
among individuals and countries differs from that of other natural
resources. For example, Egypt itself (the gift of the Nile) exists as a
country today because Egyptians for millennia harnessed the Nile's
waters, in spite of the fact that Egypt contributes almost no water to the
river. To suggest that such waters be divided now according to the
natural characteristics of the Nile would seem precipitous. Elsewhere, use
of this factor as the sole criterion for apportionment could be wielded by
powerful upstream riparians to deny those in the downstream water they
may be entitled to on other grounds. For our case study, were the
formula of Zarour and Isaac to be applied to the common Palestinian-Israeli waters the Palestinian share would perhaps be 80 percent or more,
the exact opposite of the present distribution. Obviously, Israel would
reject such an outcome. Even more, it could use such a proposition as an
extra excuse to retain the headwaters.
Briefly, it would seem then that selectively invoking factors based
on prior use and hydrology leads to irreconcilable claims. A realistic
reallocation would give each party less than the 80 percent they now
demand. How much each party should be allotted would be calculated
by weighing the rest of the factors as well.
2. Social and Economic Needs
Assessing how water division can be based on the social and
economic needs of both sides helps us to view water as a means rather
than an end. This has a precedent in the Johnston Plan where the division
of water was based on irrigation water requirements. The region has
changed since the plan, and the substantial population growth in the
interim and that expected in the coming years have led many analysts to
argue that securing fresh water for drinking ought to top the hierarchy
of needs.
In order to estimate the needs, I use the "baseline," or basic-needs,
approach employed by Shuval. The author posits that baseline fresh
water requirements per person would be: 100 cmy for municipal
(domestic, commercial and industrial), and 25 cmy for agriculture. He
assumes 65 percent of municipal waste water would be treated and

15. Julio Barberis, 77e Devlopment of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater, 31
Nat. Resources J. 177-78 (1991).

Spring 19951

PALEST7/AN-ISRAEU WATERS

reused in industry and agriculture, which means the gross per capita
agricultural water requirements would be nearly 90 cmy. Based on these
assumptions, and a "hypothetical" population in the year 2022 of five
million Palestinians and 10 million Israelis, the baseline requirements
would total 625 mcmy and 1,250 mcmy for the two sides, respectively.
Shuval does not examine the implications of his estimate of needs
for the reallocation of the common waters. Estimating the needs requires
the inclusion of population as a variable. Furthermore, after determining
the water needs it is necessary to check them against the water each side
possesses, apart from the common waters, and then divide the common
water accordingly. In effect, splitting the common waters according to the
needs factor amounts to splitting the water sources within the boundaries
of Mandate Palestine according to population ratios. If we take Shuvals
estimates at face value and keep in mind the data difficulties, the shares
would be 74 percent for Palestinians and 26 percent for Israel.
3. Comparative Costs of Alternative Resources
Alternative water resources refer specifically to potential sources-such as desalination of brackish groundwater, seawater and imported
water-not sources presently exploited or those comparable to them.
Those sources, by increasing the size of the "bucket," could facilitate an
equitable sharing agreement. They are not an alternative to equitable
distribution, as, for example, many of their Israeli advocates seem to
suggest. They are one factor among others to consider in the determination of shares. How they affect the equation of equitable apportionment
depends on their availability and comparative costs of harnessing them.
Naturally, the relative availability of alternative resources must be
assessed first, for a riparian without alternative sources, comparative
costs are an academic question. The comparative costs are a yardstick of
the parties' ability to harness alternative resources. The party that is more
able would be entitled to a smaller share of the common sources (just
within the confines of this factor).
There are potentially two alternative ways of obtaining water for
Israelis and Palestinians: Importation and desalination of brackish and,
saline water. Regarding importation, numerous schemes have been
proposed for transporting water via pipelines or canals from the
"water-rich" countries in the Middle East to the poorly endowed. Those
schemes require a separate treatment. All that can be said here is that
they are last-resort, long-run options to be taken after a discernible
stabilization of regional politics. Under present conditions, such schemes
would, strategically, increase the vulnerability of Israel, but more so of
the Palestinians since Israel could project its military power far afield to
protect the water conduits, whereas the Palestinians lack such an option.
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At the risk of dramatization, a limited defense force and water from
Turkey, for example, would put the Palestinians' very survival at the
mercy of the unstable political winds of the region. Be that as it may, the
procedure of estimating comparative costs, which I will discuss only in
regard to desalination, is applicable to the importation schemes as well.
Desalination technology can be used to extract fresh water from
either brackish or saline water. In the West Bank, Palestinians could tap
brackish water mainly from the eastern aquifer, perhaps less than 50
many. More than one-half of Gaza's aquifer, which I have been counting
as a "mainstream" source, has become for all practical purposes an
"alternative" source in that it requires desalination to make it fit for
drinking, even for irrigation; it may have be to be considered as such in
calculating the water shares from common resources. There is much less
brackish water in the OPT than in Israel where there are scattered
brackish water sources throughout; more crucial than these sources,
however, is the tremendous brackish-saline aquifer underlying the Negev.
That aquifer might suffice the water needs of the Negev region, which
was allocated about 20 percent of the water by the late 1970s, for perhaps
a century. It could even be used to irrigate crops in the central coastal
area.
Other than ground brackish-saline water, there is sea water. The
West Bank is a landlocked territory and does not have a sea front, while
Gaza has a modest front which may be able to support a major desalination plant. Israel, on the other hand, enjoys a broad sea front extending
from the Lebanese border to Gaza's, which gives it flexibility in plant
location.
Desalination technology, both of brackish and sea water is
available and represents a viable option, particularly for Israel. As for
costs, it is reasonable to suppose that the absolute, micro-costs of
desalination (plant and operation costs) would be comparable in both the
West Bank and Gaza and Israel. Comparative costs would have then to
be evaluated with reference to the size of investment relative to the size
of the macroeconomy as well as consumer prices.
Measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Israel's economy in
1992 was, by official accounts, more than 25 times larger than that of the
West Bank and Gaza, and its GNP per capita six times higher. The gap
has widened after the battering of the Palestinian economy during the
intifada. Furthermore, Israel already possesses the industry and technology of desalination, while Palestinians would have to import it. All of this
makes Israel more capable of tapping the desalination alternative than
Palestinians in the OPT.
The other aspect of comparative costs is the relative ability of the
consumer to pay for the desalinated water. Based on the present
consumer prices in Israel and the OPT as well as on various estimates of
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desalination costs,16 the following can be inferred. In Israel, desalinated
brackish and saline water, is affordable for municipal use and economical
for agriculture, while desalinated seawater is affordable for domestic use
and may be economical for some crops. In the West Bank, desalinated
brackish water might be affordable for municipal use, even for agriculture in the Jordan Valley. Gaza consumers, conversely, would be heavily
burdened by the costs of desalinated water, even of the brackish type.
All in all, the OPT have limited brackish water, and only Gaza
has access to seawater. Israel, on the other hand, possesses huge
quantities of brackish water and practically limitless amounts of sea
water. Also, the comparative costs both to the national economy and to
consumers are far more favorable to Israel. The situation could be tipped
even further in favor of Israel if plant operations costs are lowered by
implementing some of the "megaprojects," such as the "Med-Dead" and
"Red-Dead" projects that would generate hydropower by harnessing the
differential head between the Jordan Rift and the Mediterranean and Red
Seas, on the one hand, and the Dead Sea on the other. This reasoning
would suggest that, from the standpoint of alternative sources, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would be entitled to a larger portion of
the common waters than Israel.
4. Avoidance of Appreciable Harm
Appreciable harm refers to costs that can be objectively measured
as a result of denial of water rights. For appreciable harm to exist, "There
must be," according to the 1988 Report of the ILC, "a real impairment of
use, i.e., a detrimental impact of some consequence upon, for example,
public health, industry, property, agriculture or the environment.""7 The
implication of this factor is obvious: no riparian can deny water to a
co-riparian if that denial causes appreciable harm, and water must be
reallocated in order to stop the infringement. The riparian causing the
infringement would in all likelihood contend that it would be appreciably

16. The costs of desalinated brackish water may amount to 30-40 cents/cm; seawater,

60-80 cents/cm. The costs are driven by the price of energy and would change in accordance
with the price of oil. In Israel, average costs of production of regular water ran to about 26
cents/cm in the late 1980s; domestic consumers in that country paid a progressive rate
averaging 90 cents/cm, whereas, farmers paid a subsidized rate of about 15 cents/cm.
Palestinians in the West Bank paid more than $1.0/cm for domestic water and 35 cents/cm
for irrigation water from wells (irrigation water from springs is free). In Gaza, the price
averaged 20 cents/cm for irrigation water and 14 cents/cm for domestic water because the
water table is much shallower, rendering production costs lower. See Awartani, supra note
23; Keenan, supra note 57, at 20-23; Tahal Consulting Engineers, Ltd., supra note 18, at 9.2,
9.3.
17. Goldberg, supra note 32, at 72 (citing Report of the ILC (1988)).
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harmed by reallocation. In that case, both claims must be examined and
ways found to balance the relative harm incurred by each of the
co-riparians.
Palestinians have undoubtedly sustained appreciable harm, and
the case for reallocation has been implicitly argued essentially on those
grounds. The impact of reallocation on Israel depends on how much
water it would have to give up, or rather, give back. The sector most
likely to be affected directly is agriculture. Israeli agriculture's share in
1992 was nearly three percent both of GDP and of employment,"8
suggesting that appreciable harm may not result from the reduction of
water allocation to that sector. Those indicators cannot by themselves
serve as reliable predictors, and more detailed impact analysis would be
required. Nevertheless, an estimate by a study group at the Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University shows that a reduction in the
amount of available water by 100-200 mcmy and its replacement by
desalinated water would cost the Israeli economy $30-90 million, and an
input/output impact analysis by G. Fishelson finds that cutting irrigation
water usage in Israel by one-half would reduce the GDP by two
percent. 9 G. Fishelson's estimate was for 1982-1983 when agriculture
contributed six percent of the GDP. Today, the impact is likely to be even
smaller as agriculture's share of the GDP has diminished to less than
three percent. Even if the costs were to prove appreciable, the cuts could
be phased without causing "shocks" to the Israeli economy while at the
same time not unduly hampering the growth of the Palestinian economy:
Palestinian water demand is not likely to rise substantially overnight.
Also, part of the increase could be satisfied first from untapped portions
of the eastern aquifer and flood run-off, spring rehabilitation, and
phasing out the irrigated agriculture of the settlements. At the same time,
the Palestinians would agree to sell Israel what remains of their share,
reducing the amount over time according to the growth of their
consumption-until each party receives its agreed share. This would
leave Israel time to make the necessary adjustments in its economic
structure and investment in alternative water sources.
Moreover, ways might be found to effect an exchange of various
types of water that would reduce the harm even further, if not result in
net benefits to both sides, and increase the efficiency of water use.
Aquifers are functionally less versatile than rivers. For example, they

18. This was the case in 1992. See Central Bureau of Statistics, supra note 21.
19. Jaffee Center for Strategis Studies (JCSS), The West Bank And Gaza: Isarael's Options
For Peace 219-29 (The Jersualem Post for Tel Aviv U., West Jerusalem, 1989). G. Fishelson,
Allocation and Marginal Value Product of water in Israeli Agriculture, (a revised version
of a paper with same title presented at the First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic
conference on Water, Zurich, Switzerland, De. 13-16, 1992, photocopy).
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cannot be dammed, generate hydroelectric power or be used for
recreation and navigation. This confines the "basket of goods" that can be
traded among the conflicting riparians essentially to water and makes the
division appear to be a zero-sum game: one side's gain is the other side's
loss.
Nonetheless, the water is not all the same. It is differentiated
according to several attributes: freshness-salinity, location, renewable-fossil, shallow-deep, upstream-downstream. One side may be willing to
exchange a larger quantity of brackish water in one location for a smaller
quantity of fresh water from another, or a smaller quantity of the same
type of water from a shallow well for a larger one from a deep well, and
so on. D. Yaron and A. Ratner" have done a study for regional water
exchanges within Israel based on this premise. It goes without saying that
the institutional and political context of international cooperation
complicates such a possibility and may render it impractical. Nevertheless, the parties may wish to explore further the distinctions among types
of water in expanding the realms of costs and benefits. They may be able
thus to enhance the efficiency of water use, as well as reach a more
ambiguous deal easier to accept politically. And it is here that analytical
approaches from welfare economics and cooperative game theory, which
I have mentioned earlier, may fruitfully supplement considerations of
international water law.
Finally, Israel would be able to capture even greater benefits from
regional cooperation in the wake of a peaceful settlement. The benefits
would transcend the water sector; but even in the water sector alone and
in water-related technology trade Israel could profit. I have already
indicated that Israel possesses desalination technology of brackish and sea
water. It also runs an advanced research and development (R&D)
desalination program. The largest desalination market is in the Middle
East, owing in part to the paucity of water and abundance of energy
resources. One would expect that Israel would be keenly interested in
such market. A second area is hydroelectric power generation, I am
referring here to megaprojects such as the aforementioned Med-Dead and
Red-Dead canals. These projects require large capital outlays, and no
multilateral aid agency, such as the World Bank, would be in a position
to assist without the approval of the Arab parties.
In short, Israel not only does not have to sustain appreciable
harm as a consequence of reallocation; it also stands to gain in the context
of a peaceful settlement through selling desalination technology and
tapping hydroelectric power.

20. D. Yaron and A. Ratner, Regional Cooperation In The Use of Irrigation Water: Efficiency
and Income Distribution,4 Agricultural Economics 45-58 (1990).
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CONCLUSION

Israel's unilateral, disproportionate appropriation of the common
Palestinian-Israeli has left Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with
a substandard level of consumption and created a wide water gap
between them and Israelis. It runs counter to the international water law
doctrine of equitable distribution. Examination of the factors stipulated
in the doctrine as a basis for an equitable distribution with respect to the
Israeli-Palestinian common waters reveals several important conclusions.
First, Israel's insistence on maintaining prior use and Palestinian demand
that water be split according to natural attributes of the water sources
lead to irreconcilable claims. Second, Israel's refusal to reach an equitable
distribution on the basis of the availability to Palestinians of alternative
water resources is untenable. On the contrary, brackish and saline water
resources and the economic and technical capability to tap them are far
more available to Israel than to Palestinians. Importing water from other
countries is also more viable for Israel than for Palestinians: Israel could
project its military power to protect the water conduits, whereas the
Palestinians could not. Third, the possibility of Israel sustaining appreciable harm can be avoided through an agreement by Palestinians to sell to
it, in a phased manner, the part of their water share in excess of their
water needs. Nor is it a zero-sum game. In the wake of a peaceful
settlement, Israel can greatly profit from selling desalination technology
in the principal Middle East market, as well as generating hydroelectric
power from projects that require approval of the Arab side. Fourth, the
two sides may wish to simplify the negotiations, and thereby reduce the
"transactions costs" and speed up reaping the "peace dividend," by
agreeing to consider the social and economic needs as the core factor.
This has a precedent in the Johnston Plan. It would mean dividing the
legitimate water of geographic Palestine among the two parties according
to population size. Finally, reaching an equitable sharing regime is
possible, and would offer an example, and perhaps hope, for the rest of
the region that water can become a chameleon of cooperation rather than
a chameleon of conflict.

